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Digital transformation of business-to-government reporting: An institutional work 
perspective 
Abstract 
Traditional business-to-government reporting is a core remit of the accounting function but is 
associated with a significant administrative burden on business. This burden is a major 
obstacle hindering business efforts to achieve core efficiency and innovation objectives. We 
use the conceptual lens of institutional work to examine how traditional business-to-
government reporting is abolished and how digital reporting is established to replace it in 
attempts to reduce administrative burden but without compromising regulation effectiveness. 
We adopt a comparative approach to analyse qualitative evidence from three jurisdictions, 
namely, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Australia. Regulators across these jurisdictions 
have been both pioneers and leaders internationally to transform business-to-government 
reporting in multi-agency settings. Our analyses illustrate how institutional work to develop 
digital business-to-government reporting across the jurisdictions was shaped by international 
influences and local factors. We also illuminate how actor engagement issues and the 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing nature of a mosaic of forms of institutional work shaped 
the path of these transformations. The study contributes to existing research by explaining 
how supportive conditions and structures are brought about and made to coalesce in the 
regulatory business reporting space for digital reporting to become established and widely 
adopted by business. 
Keywords: institutional work, administrative burden, digital reporting, XBRL. 
JEL: O33, O38 
1. Introduction 
Traditional business-to-government reporting has been widely criticised in many countries 
around the world for being inefficient, complex and often duplicated (Bozanic, Dirsmith & 
Huddart, 2012; Chen, 2012). It has resulted in a significant administrative burden on 
business, a major barrier hindering achievement of core business objectives. In response, 
many regulators around the world have undertaken efforts to transform reporting to 
government to reduce administrative burdens on business. Key benefits expected from this 
transformation are to help business focus on core activity, to improve innovation and 
efficiency, and to enhance competitiveness and well-being in the broader society (Arnold et 
al., 2011; Bharosa et al., 2015). 
In this study, we focus on the work that is carried out by regulators and other actors to 
achieve this transformation. This undertaking is challenging: it includes abolishing traditional 
forms of business-to-government reporting and establishing new forms of reporting that will 
effectively reduce administrative burden on business but without compromising regulation 
effectiveness. 
The study addresses the research questions of how traditional business-to-government 
reporting is abolished and how a new form of reporting is established to replace it. The 
answer to these questions contributes to existing research by illuminating the nature of the 
efforts that are undertaken to create new forms of reporting to government, including how 
and why these efforts are undertaken and by whom. This helps explain how supportive 
conditions emerge and are made to coalesce in the regulatory business reporting arena for a 
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new form of reporting to become established and widely adopted by business (Bozanic, 
Dirsmith & Huddart, 2012). 
For the purposes of the study, we conceptualise business-to-government reporting as an 
institution. According to Jepperson (1991) an institution is “an organized, established 
procedure” (p.143), a “stable design for chronically repeated activity sequences” (p.145). 
Institutions support the reproduction of a practice while also restricting what actors can and 
cannot do as they interact. This conceptualisation is justified because business-to-government 
reporting is a well-defined and standardised practice that governs patterns of interaction (and 
associated predictable outcomes) between business and government. 
Business-to-government reporting is underpinned by regulation, the legal instruments 
including rules and laws (e.g., tax legislation) designed by an authority to control conduct in 
an industry or broader society (Arnold et al., 2011; Bozanic, Dirsmith & Huddart, 2012). 
However, as businesses comply with regulation they incur costs. A significant portion of 
these costs is called administrative burden: the costs of “complying with information 
obligations stemming from government regulation” (OECD, 2007a, p.27). Information 
obligations include the systematic preparation and filing of information in government 
reports (de Winne et al., 2011). Businesses that decline to fulfil information obligations face 
sanctions (SCMN, 2003). There is broad agreement that reporting to government imposes a 
significant administrative burden on business (Bharosa et al., 2015). 
We examine the transformation of reporting to government to reduce administrative burden 
on business. We adopt the conceptual lens of institutional work. Institutional work focuses on 
how an institution becomes a product of human action (Hopper & Major, 2007; Lawrence, 
Suddaby & Leca, 2009). Institutional work perspective can help conceptualise transformation 
of reporting to government as work that is carried out by actors aiming at removing an 
established institution, i.e., traditional reporting associated with high administrative burden, 
and establishing a new form of reporting that is based on different principles aiming at 
reducing the burden. 
The new form of reporting is called digital reporting which is being implemented around the 
world by using XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) as key technology. XBRL 
is based on principles that are radically different to those powering traditional reporting. 
Although often presented in electronic formats (e.g., PDF), traditional reporting remains 
fundamentally paper-based, a key reason underpinning inefficiency, complexity, and 
duplication problems. XBRL facilitates structuring of information in digital reports which 
helps address these problems (Alles & Piechocki, 2012; Doolin & Troshani, 2004; O'Riain, 
Curry & Harth, 2012; Troshani, Parker & Lymer, 2015). 
Our specific focus is on the actual filing mechanism of business reports to government. We 
examine the transformation work and outcomes associated with the changing of technologies 
businesses have used to file government reports but which preserve the paper-based nature of 
traditional reports (e.g., PDF) to digital reporting technology that is enabled by XBRL. 
Whilst the content of the digital reports (determined by regulation and accounting standards) 
is retained in the transformation, digital business reporting has significant implications 
concerning the rationalisation of the ways in which business information obligations are 
captured and used for compliance assessment across wider government. 
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Examining institutional work that drives transformation from one institution to another 
enables unpicking interstitial elements. It directs focus on the gap between traditional 
reporting, i.e., the institution that dictates how business report to government, and action, that 
which actors are doing to challenge and abolish it and create digital reporting as a new 
institution. This setting is useful for closely looking at the relationship between institutions 
and action (structure and agency), and to better understand why and how actors are working 
to transform reporting to government and how their actions lead to both intended and 
unintended consequences (Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 2013; Suddaby, Saxton & Gunz, 2015). 
We contribute to the wider institutional research in several ways. First, we provide extensive 
empirical evidence based on qualitative data sourced from face-to-face interviews and 
documentary evidence from across three jurisdictions: Netherlands, United Kingdom (UK) 
and Australia. We focus specifically on these countries because of action they have 
undertaken aimed at reducing administrative burden as priority in their regulatory reform and 
policy agendas. In this process, these countries have often followed each other’s lead. 
Examining them simultaneously thus improves understanding of commonalities and 
differences in institutional work and the manner in which they influenced each other to 
generate similar and often different outcomes. Importantly, focusing on these countries side-
by-side offers insight that would otherwise be difficult to provide, had they been examined 
separately. Furthermore, these countries are highly regarded internationally to have built up 
exemplary institutional capacity for transforming business-to-government reporting as wider 
multi-agency projects (Katsoulacos, Makri & Bageri, 2011; OECD, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
Thus, our examination in these settings presents an ideal opportunity to better understand 
issues that emerge in multi-agency projects and the manner in which a multi-agency scope 
strengthens (or threatens) their success. 
Second, our examination helps trace the specific types of institutional work alongside the 
institutional changes that occurred as a result. This adds to the literature by providing a 
nuanced understanding of the reflexive relationship between forms of institutional work 
(action), and resulting patterns of institutional change (structure), that is specific to business-
to-government reporting. Managing and delivering business reporting (of financial and non-
financial information) to regulators (or other actors) constitutes a core remit of the accounting 
function. There are ongoing calls for further research that improves understanding of the 
relationship between agency and structure in different domains (Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby, Saxton & Gunz, 2015). 
Third, existing research has predominantly focused on institutional work aimed at creating 
and maintaining new institutions (see e.g., Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016; Chiwamit, Modell & 
Yang, 2014; Kettunen, 2017), featuring incidental references to work that disrupts institutions 
(see e.g., Hayne & Free, 2014). This research has generally ignored institutional work 
forming alternative paths of institution building (Granlund, 2011; Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 
2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011). Our evidence 
illuminates a path to institution building whereby actors purposively engaged in work that at 
first disrupted an existing institution, followed by work to create and maintain a new 
institution in its place (Jepperson, 1991). This path is consistent with practice where new 
institutions supersede old institutions, but remains nevertheless under-researched. 
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This paper is structured as follows. First we discuss the theoretical underpinning of the study, 
followed by an overview of related research including XBRL, a key digital reporting 
technology. Thereafter, data collection and analysis considerations are explained before 
results are analysed and discussed. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the 
contribution, limitations and future research. 
2. Theoretical underpinning 
We examine our evidence by using the conceptual lens of institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). We adapt Lawrence & Suddaby’s (2006) institutional work definition as the 
“purposive action of individuals and organizations” (p. 215) that aims at disrupting an old 
institution, and creating a new one with which to replace the old (Lawrence, Suddaby & 
Leca, 2009).  
Action is characterised as purposive, intelligent and situated while actors that undertake it are 
characterised as “reflexive, goal-oriented and capable” (Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 2013), 
p.1024). Institutional work focuses on the “internal life” a process and the world inside it, 
rather than on the process itself as a sequence of activities (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Institutional work examines the “creative and knowledgeable work of actors which may or 
may not achieve its desired end and which interacts with existing social and technological 
structures in unintended and unexpected ways” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 219). 
The need for disrupting an institution often emerges when contradictions develop between an 
institution and the organisational field, the broader terrain where an institution operates 
(Jepperson, 1991). Contradictions occur when the interests of certain actors, who also operate 
in the organisational field, are not served by an institution as expected. These actors will 
often engage in action that challenges, undermines and even rejects both the institution and 
its rationale (Oliver, 1992). Oliver (1992) describes disruption work as “a direct assault on 
the validity of a long standing tradition or established activity [existing institutions]” (p. 567) 
that aims “at tearing them down or rendering them ineffectual” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, 
p. 217). 
Disruption work can take many forms. Actors often attempt to disconnect the rewards 
(sanctions) that are associated with compliance (non-compliance) from specific institutions. 
In other forms, disruption work disassociates an institution from its moral or normative 
foundations in a specific context. Disruption work can also undermine key assumptions and 
beliefs in the organisational field that complying (or not) with an institution is associated with 
benefits (costs) (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Creation work establishes a new institution, the new rules which, when repeatedly activated, 
enable the reproduction of patterns of behaviour by actors (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Creation work establishes rewards (sanctions) ensuring enforcement of the new rules. 
Rewards and sanctions incentivise actors to comply with institutions and counteract non-
compliance (Jepperson, 1991). Creation work can also take many forms. Actors can engage 
in overt or covert political work attempting to reconstruct rules that govern how actors 
operate in the organisational field (e.g., rules that determine how certain resources can be 
accessed or how rights to resource ownership are conferred). Creation work can also attempt 
to reconfigure belief or normative systems (e.g., redefining identities or normative 
associations among actors) or altering meaning systems (e.g., concepts). Creation work is 
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generally strengthened by maintaining work which aims at “supporting, repairing or 
recreating the social mechanisms that insure compliance” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 
230). Maintaining work can take many forms, including enabling work that facilitates, 
supports and supplements institutions and embedding and routinizing work which attempts to 
infuse institutions into actors’ daily routines and practices (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
3. Prior research  
Institutional work in parallels earlier efforts of institutional scholars to investigate the 
interplay between agency and structure (see e.g., Burns & Scapens, 2000; Dillard, Rigsby & 
Goodman, 2004; Guerreiro, Rodrigues & Craig, 2014; Modell, 2014; Boulianne & Cho, 
2009). Institutional work, however, extends traditional institutional research by providing 
specific fine-grained analytical tools that specifically examine the various types of work 
(agency) that can be used to shape institutions (structure)(Chiwamit, Modell & Yang, 2014; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Although relatively new, institutional work has begun influencing the focus of institutional 
research (Goretzki, Strauss & Weber, 2013). For example, institutional work has been 
adopted as analytical lens to examine the relationship between agency and structure in 
relation to the creation of some accounting institutions including Economic Value Added 
(EVA) (Chiwamit, Modell & Yang, 2014), the Committee of Sponsoring Organisation’s 
(COSO) Enterprise Risk Management–Integrated Framework (ERM–IF) (Hayne & Free, 
2014), domain change in accounting expertise (Suddaby, Saxton & Gunz, 2015), regulatory 
change in the accounting profession (Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016), and interlingual translation 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Kettunen, 2017).  
These studies constitute some key contributions spanning different accounting domains. 
However, institutional work is an “umbrella concept and a rallying point” (Hwang & 
Colyvas, 2011, p.62) that has yet to form into a coherent framework (Hayne & Free, 2014). 
New opportunities in other domains must be sought that describe and explain the nature of 
institutional work that is carried out to shape institutions (Hayne & Free, 2014; Suddaby, 
Saxton & Gunz, 2015). We argue that business-to-government reporting is an important 
accounting domain where institutional work has become instrumental to regulators (and 
others) to achieve transformations aiming to reduce administrative burden on business.  
The actors that populate the field of business-to-government reporting are different and the 
manner in which they engage or become engaged in institutional work varies since it is often 
driven by different motivations. Consequently, the manner in which these actors affect a 
particular outcome or are affected by it is also likely to vary. By focusing on action itself, an 
institutional work perspective can direct attention to the relational and interactive moments of 
institutional disruption, creation and maintenance, thereby enabling us to better understand 
the broader patterns of the actors’ motivation, intent, capacity and effort that effect 
institutional change (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). 
To illustrate, the field of business-to-government reporting is densely populated by many 
different actors including business and intermediaries (e.g., accountants, financial advisors, 
bookkeepers, tax agents, payroll professionals). Intermediaries often assist business to fulfil 
their information obligations. Business and intermediaries are collectively referred to as 
preparers since they prepare and file business reports to regulators. Regulators process 
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business reports to fulfil their regulatory functions (e.g., compliance assessment including tax 
revenue collection). Other relevant actors operating in the field include professional 
accounting bodies or industry associations which represent the interests of various business 
groups, and software developers who provide software applications that facilitate reporting 
interactions between business and regulators.  
This organisational field includes organisations and bodies that have created and maintain 
technologies for powering software applications. For example, XBRL, a digital data standard 
for codifying business reporting data, was formally developed by XBRL International Inc. 
(XII), an international consortium that coordinates the efforts in local jurisdictions based on 
countries or internationally recognised business reporting regimes (Alles & Piechocki, 2012; 
Locke & Lowe, 2007; Srivastava & Kogan, 2010). Local XBRL consortia of Netherlands, 
UK, and Australia are XBRL Netherlands, XBRL UK, and XBRL Australia, respectively, all 
XII members. These consortia have attempted to promote XBRL within their jurisdictions 
(Troshani & Lymer, 2010). 
XBRL is a digital reporting technology that uses ‘tagging’ to associate contextual information 
with data points in business reports. XBRL structures reports in ways that allow computer-
based processes to automatically process financial data at a granular level (Turner, 2005). 
Digital reporting with XBRL is different to traditional reporting which relies on paper-based 
or electronic formats (e.g., PDF) that can only be read by humans but which require 
extensive, inefficient and error-prone manual intervention when further processing is needed 
(Guilloux, Locke & Lowe, 2013). A key implication is that digital reports in XBRL format 
can be automatically exchanged and processed by disparate computer platforms and 
accounting applications. For example, accounting applications used by preparers and 
regulators can automatically and ‘intelligently’ recognise specific tagged data in digital 
reports and extract required data without manual intervention. Another implication is that 
digital reports can also be rendered to formats that are suitable for human users (e.g., PDF) 
(Troshani, Parker & Lymer, 2015). 
XBRL tags are based on accounting standards and regulatory reporting regimes, often set by 
national and international standard-setters and defined in XBRL taxonomies. A taxonomy is a 
data dictionary that defines XBRL tags and maps them to accounting concepts while also 
defining their relationships and processing rules (Doolin & Troshani, 2004). XBRL 
taxonomies are developed on a jurisdictional basis. So the taxonomy of a jurisdiction reflects 
both its accounting standards and GAAP. To facilitate digital reporting between preparers 
and regulators, XBRL taxonomies need to be used with accounting applications that must be 
enabled with additional functionality to process digital reports (Turner, 2005). 
Whilst existing research is available that has examined the adoption of XBRL in various 
jurisdictions (see e.g., Abdolmohammadi et al., 2017; Doolin & Troshani, 2007; Henderson, 
Sheetz & Trinkle, 2012; Premuroso & Bhattacharya, 2008; Shan & Troshani, 2014, 2016, 
Shan, Troshani & Richardson, 2015; Troshani & Lymer, 2010; Valentinetti & Rea, 2012; 
Troshani & Doolin, 2007; Troshani & Rao, 2007), this research treats XBRL as a given 
technology, while the actors that use it are treated as rational decision makers who are driven 
by economic and efficiency objectives. Notable exceptions to this research are the works of 
Troshani et al., (2015) and Guilloux et al., (2013) which examine XBRL institutionalisation 
as process. However, these studies focus on XBRL itself and tend to overlook the broader 
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institutional work that is carried out in the organisational field. By focusing on institutional 
work, this paper extends existing research by elaborating how a wide range of conducive 
conditions are brought about and how suitable supporting structures have become 
materialised for the embedding of XBRL into a broader digital business-to-government 
reporting institution after abolishing traditional filing mechanisms. 
4. Data collection and analysis 
In this study, actor interpretations concerning the transformation of business-to-government 
reporting were captured using a qualitative approach. Data were collected by interviewing 
relevant informants and reviewing supporting documentation pertaining to Netherlands, UK 
and Australia. The key reason for selecting these countries is that they were key pioneers and 
internationally recognised exemplars in business-to-government reporting transformation in 
multi-agency settings (OECD, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
Australia is a federal coordinated state, whereas the Netherlands is a unitary, but 
decentralised state. The UK is a unitary centralised state where a single party has been 
dominant for more than ten years, although typically considered to be a two-party system. In 
Australia and the UK, decision-making is driven by the majority, whereas in the Netherlands 
the dominating mechanisms are consensus-based where negotiations among parties take place 
and all parties have to agree to some extent before subjecting decisions to voting. This can 
hamper swift progress, but once decisions are made they benefit from being widely accepted 
which is not always easy to achieve in the other two jurisdictions (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). 
The consensual approach in the Netherlands results in many consultative and advisory 
councils which are involved in relatively open processes. 
Interviews were used because of their flexibility (Myers & Newman, 2007). Interviews 
provide rich insights for exploring, identifying and understanding viewpoints, attitudes, and 
influences (Myers & Newman, 2007). Moreover, they also allow greater control over the 
interview situation (e.g., sequencing of questions) while providing opportunities for 
clarification and collecting supplementary information (Myers & Newman, 2007). In the 
Netherlands, the interviews took place between January 2008 and August 2016 lasting 
between 45-90 minutes. The UK interviews took place between September 2008 and April 
2015 and ranged between 43-80 minutes. The Australian interviews were conducted between 
April 2008 and January 2014 and ranged between 37-116 minutes. All interviews were 
transcribed. The interview periods for each country were deliberately selected as key 
decisions and developments took place during the selected periods in each country in relation 
to the justification and formative development for digital reporting to government. Additional 
data were sourced from technical reports, relevant websites, industry, professional and 
government publications across jurisdictions to both capture XBRL developments beyond the 
selected interview periods and also to triangulate interview evidence. 
Interviewees were informants who primarily held managerial roles in various organisations 
that were participating in the transformation of business-to-government reporting. The roles 
of the interviewees included: managers; heads of accounting, auditing, data assurance and 
ICT departments; directors of industry associations; software developers and chief executive 
officers of software development organisations; strategy and policy managers in government 
departments. The interviewees were identified using theoretical and snowball sampling to 
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ensure representation of key actors. To maintain anonymity, only the categories of 
interviewees’ organisations have been identified in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Interviewees 







Large accounting firms    (LAF)  3/3 3/5 4/4 
Professional accounting bodies/ industry 
associations (PAB/IA) 
 3/3 2/2 2/4 
Regulatory agencies (RA)  7/13 4/6 3/5 
Local XBRL consortium (LXC)  1/4 1/3 1/2 
Software developers/vendors (SD/V)  6/7 4/6 5/5 
Total  20/30 14/22 15/20 
Interviewee Key: CountryIdentifier_OrganisationCategory_OrganisationNumber_#IntervieweeNumber 
Example(s):    AU_LAF_1_#1 refers to Interviewee #1 of Large accounting firm 1 in Australia; 
NL_LXC_1_#2 refers to Interviewee #2 of Local XBRL consortium in the Netherlands; 
UK_SD/V_4_#2 refers to Interviewee number #2 of Software developer/vendor 4 in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
A summary of the study objectives and open-ended semi-structured questions was provided 
to interviewees, giving them time to prepare while also allowing them maximum freedom 
when considering their viewpoints. Questions concerned issues such as: organisational roles, 
interests and objectives of involvement in business-to-government reporting transformation, 
the role of professional and industry associations and regulators, and XBRL development and 
adoption issues (see Appendix). 
We used our selected theoretical underpinning as a basis for data collection and thematic 
analysis. That is, theory was used to frame themes drawn from the data for analysis. Data 
collection and analysis proceeded hand-in-hand; analysis commenced immediately and 
progressed as data became available and while collection continued. Data collection and 
analysis thus informed and guided each other while converging on themes (Myers & 
Newman, 2007). Rich and diverse textual data collected were analysed on an interpretative 
basis. Themes were incrementally developed by the condensing, clustering and conceptual 
grouping of identified categories. To elicit meaning and interpretations, data were read 
multiple times to carefully target higher-order generalisations, shifting frequently between the 
general and the specific, and in the process, comparing, contrasting, analysing relations, and 
triangulating identified patterns of themes against alternative data sources. In the process, the 
structure and analysis of findings were amended until a thorough and coherent understanding 
of the phenomena represented in the data was assembled and developed based on a logical 
chain of evidence (Yin, 2009). 
5. Findings and analysis 
In this section we discuss the key forms of institutional work observed across the selected 
jurisdictions. Broadly, the discussion focuses on forms of disrupting, creating, and 
maintaining work to abolish traditional business-to-government reporting and replace it with 
digital reporting (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). We compare our findings in order to highlight 
cross-jurisdiction similarities and differences. Our choice of presenting the observed forms of 
institutional work linearly is broadly driven by historical and presentation considerations, 
although in practice we find that institutional work occurs in an interwoven and fluid manner. 
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5.1. Disrupting traditional regulation and advocacy for better regulation  
Whilst regulation is considered to be important in the Netherlands, UK and Australia, making 
business comply with excessive regulation was widely considered by regulators as harmful. 
A key implication of excessive regulation is high administrative burden on business which 
threatens competitiveness, productivity and innovation across the jurisdictions (DTI, 1985; 
Hilmer, Rayner & Taperell, 1993; OECD, 2010b). While these jurisdictions suffered from 
excessive regulation, the conditions contributing to excessive regulation were different 
between them. 
Being part of the European Union (EU), there is an obligation for the Netherlands and UK to 
incorporate EU regulation into their national law. For example, approximately 50 percent of 
new Dutch and British regulation originate from the EU (BRTF, 2005; Katsoulacos, Makri & 
Bageri, 2011). Such an obligation had further implications in the UK where ‘gold-plating’ 
was often used, a practice whereby EU regulation was extended by the UK Government 
beyond the original minimum requirements before being incorporated into UK national 
regulation. Whilst the aim of gold-plating was to tailor EU regulation to specific UK 
conditions, a key implication was that it increased the compliance burden on UK business.2 
The Netherlands is also characterised by a unique regulation-setting culture. Dutch 
governments are typically structured as coalitions of many political parties while political 
culture features a strong orientation toward common interests (OECD, 1999). A key 
implication is that regulation was often outcome of cartel arrangements and a style of 
decision-making strongly driven by consensus-seeking processes. These processes often led 
to regulation that was satisfactory to all parties involved in regulation-setting but that was 
often difficult to implement in practice (OECD, 1999). 
Unlike the Netherlands and UK, Australia is a federation of six states and two territories that 
represent different jurisdictions within Australia. These jurisdictions are administered by their 
own governments and have different characteristics including size, industry composition and 
regulatory frameworks (PC, 2008a). An implication is that Australian regulation is made at 
many jurisdictions, i.e., at federal, state and territory levels. Although regulation in each 
jurisdiction aims to capture specific needs, there are often duplications and inconsistencies 
across states and territories (OECD, 2010c). This has led to onerous administrative burden on 
business. The burden is compounded significantly for those that operate across multiple 
jurisdictions (e.g., having to comply with same type of regulation across jurisdictions) (PC, 
2007).  
Regulators in the Netherlands, UK and Australia had similar concerns in relation the 
administrative burden and impact on productivity, growth, innovation, and competitiveness. 
For example, assessments in the 1980s3 found the Dutch regulation-setting to be highly 
complex and rigid (OECD, 1999) with compliance costs estimated at approximately 10 
                                                          
2 The practice of gold-plating has been used in the UK since it joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1973 (Katsoulacos, Makri & Bageri, 2011). In 2010, the UK Government pledged to end gold-plating 
by 2011 (BBCNews, 2013; UKGovernment, 2010). Accordingly, new guiding principles were issued ensuring 
that UK businesses would be facing only the minimum requirements of regulation originating in the EU. 
However, these principles only affected new regulation while EU regulation that was adapted before 2011 
remains ‘gold-plated’ (FBTUK, 2013). 




percent of the Dutch GDP (OECD, 1999a). Similarly, in the UK there were 62 national 
regulators in 2004 (Hampton, 2005) and the overall cost of regulation was estimated at 10-12 
percent of the UK GDP (Arculus, 2005; Tate & Clark, 2004; TPA, 2008). 
…the system as a whole is uncoordinated and good practice is not uniform. There are 
overlaps in regulators’ responsibilities and enforcement activities. There are too many forms, 
and too many duplicated information requests. (Hampton, 2005, p. 1)  
There is a clear rationale for reducing the administrative burden that regulations impose on 
business. Complying with the information requirements of UK regulations… can hamper 
business, channelling resources away from more efficient uses and act as a constraint on 
innovation, productivity and growth. (BRTF, 2005, p. 4) 
After wide-ranging consultations with Australian business and regulators an independent 
taskforce found that “there is too much regulation and, in many cases, it imposes excessive 
and unnecessary costs on business” (RegulationTaskforce, 2006, p. i). Administrative burden 
on Australian business had serious implications on broader Australian economy (Madden, 
2009; SBR, 2008b): 
The costs of regulation to business involve not just extra time, paperwork and capital outlays, 
but also deflect management from the core activities of the business. … Regulation can thus 
stifle innovation and crowd out productive activity in the ‘engine room’ of Australia’s 
economy. (RegulationTaskforce, 2006, p. ii) 
Advocacy was used in similar ways in Netherlands, UK and Australia focusing on rhetoric 
targeting the cause of administrative burden. The common theme was to focus on ‘better 
regulation’ and on making regulation “business friendly” (OECD, 2010c, p. 28). In the 
Netherlands, advocacy was framed on need for refocusing regulation on “what is strictly 
necessary” (OECD, 2007, 2010). Similarly, advocacy for “better, rather than less, regulation” 
was used in the UK (BRTF, 2005) while in Australia advocacy targeted regulation that was 
“unnecessarily burdensome, complex, redundant, or duplicate[d]” (Treasury, 2005).  
In this study, we focus on the reduction of administrative burden on business, a key theme of 
the broader ‘better regulation’ agendas4 of governments in Netherlands, UK and Australia. 
The annual administrative burden on business was estimated at approximately €350 million 
in the Netherlands (MvF, 2004; OECD, 2007), A$800 million in Australia 
(RegulationTaskforce, 2006; SBR, 2008b), and £16-20 million in UK (Carter, 2006; KPMG, 
2006). These figures were consistently used across the jurisdictions to undermine traditional 
regulation as part of advocacy work to justify the need for transformation. 
5.2 Reconfiguring identities, normative associations, vesting work: mimicking the Dutch 
A key outcome of the Dutch ‘better regulation’ program5 which was the establishment in 
1998 of the Coalition Committee for Reduction of Administrative Burdens on Enterprises, 
known as the Slechte Committee (OECD, 1999). The Slechte Committee found that existing 
government reporting norms whereby the same information was often reported by business to 
                                                          
4 ‘Better Regulation’ agendas in the Netherlands, UK and Australia included regulatory reform targeting many 
areas: reducing administrative burden on business, making business regulation understandable and easier to 
comply with, making regulation-setting processes transparent, and impact assessment of regulatory proposals 
(OECD, 2010c). 
5 The Dutch ‘better regulation’ program is known as the MDW – Marktwerking, Deregulering en 
Wetgevingskwaliteit (Market Forces, Deregulation and Legislative Quality) (OECD, 1999). 
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many regulators, was contributing significantly to the administrative burden on Dutch 
business. It defined the principle of designing regulation according to which information 
reported to government should be reused by regulators: business would report to government 
only once and regulators would then share information as needed. The reuse principle created 
the need for constructing a new government reporting identity and reconfiguring the 
associations between preparers and regulators and also among the regulators. The Slechte 
Committee also defined the principle for the independent and ongoing monitoring of 
administrative burdens which reinforced the need for an independent authority in the 
business-to-government reporting field (Katsoulacos, Makri & Bageri, 2011; OECD, 2010a). 
The Slechte Committee principles inspired action in the UK and Australia. Dedicated task 
forces were established in these jurisdictions carrying out extensive administrative burden 
assessments. These assessments culminated in detailed reports in the UK in 20056 and 
Australia in 20067. These task forces recommended mimicking the Dutch approach for 
reducing the administrative burdens which was accepted by their governments: 
We recommend that the [UK] government adopt the Dutch approach to reducing 
administrative burdens (BRTF, 2005, p.5). 
The Taskforce sees considerable potential for the Netherlands model to be implemented in 
Australia… The Australian Government should develop and adopt a business reporting 
standard within the Australian Government sphere … based on the Netherlands model 
(RegulationTaskforce, 2006, p.142) 
Vesting work followed across the three jurisdictions whereby the right and authority for the 
independent and ongoing monitoring of administrative burdens was conferred to dedicated 
bodies. The Netherlands and UK created national independent advisory bodies to support and 
monitor work to reduce administrative burden. For example, the Dutch Parliament 
established the Dutch Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens (ACTAL)8 in 2000 
(ACTAL, 2006) while the UK established the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) in 2006 
(OECD, 2010b). ACTAL and BRE carried out similar monitoring roles including promoting 
cooperation between regulators (ACTAL, 2006, 2012). 
In Australia, these roles were assigned to an existing government body, the Productivity 
Commission (PC), a standing, independent advisory body with a broad policy mandate 
(OECD, 2010c).  
While other OECD countries have established advocacy bodies on an ad hoc or standing basis 
to undertake inquiries or support the progress of reform initiatives, … [the] PC is unique in 
many important respects …  in terms of its independence, staffing size, economic expertise, 
stability and the breadth of policy issues it considers. …. But no other OECD member has 
established a standing body with as broad a mandate to undertake research and advise the 
Government on opportunities to make better policies in the long term national community 
interest (OECD, 2010c, p.14). 
                                                          
6 UK Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF)’s “Less is more” report (BRTF, 2005) and “Reducing 
Administrative Burdens” report (Hampton, 2005). 
7 Regulation Taskforce “Rethinking Regulation” report (AustralianGovernment, 2006). 
8 ACTAL (Adviescollege Toetsing Administratieve Lasten) – Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens. 
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5.3 Australia extends disruption work with benchmarking 
The Australian PC carried out additional disruption work to disassociate traditional reporting 
practice from the rationale of regulatory reporting. This work was necessary in Australia 
given its unique multi-jurisdiction environment. 
Coping with these [excessive regulation] challenges is an enormous task for any country, and 
Australia is not alone ….  Australia faces an additional complexity in tackling these 
challenges, as most reforms require action by up to nine governments (Hilmer, Rayner & 
Taperell, 1993, p. xv). 
The differences among Australian state and territory jurisdictions were often so significant 
that it was difficult and sometimes not possible to compare administrative burdens (PC, 
2008a). Furthermore, the multi-jurisdiction environment in Australia had created a regulator-
focused rather than business-centred culture of regulation that contributed to increase 
administrative burden: 
In this climate, a ‘regulate first, ask questions later’ culture appears to have developed. Even 
where regulatory action is clearly justified, options and design principles that could lessen 
compliance costs or side-effects appear to be given little consideration. Further, agencies 
responsible for administering and enforcing regulation have tended to adopt strict and often 
prescriptive or legalistic approaches, to lessen their own risks of exposure to criticism. This, 
in turn, has contributed in some areas to excessively defensive and costly actions by business 
to ensure compliance. (RegulationTaskforce, 2006, p.ii)  
In 2006, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)9 agreed that all Australian 
governments should carry out benchmarking work to assess administrative burden across 
Australian jurisdictions (PC, 2013). Benchmarking helped identify specific inconsistencies, 
duplication and underlying causes. It provided evidence justifying the need to disassociate the 
rationale of regulation from existing inconsistent regulation-setting practice and also to 
identify areas for consistent regulatory reform (COAG, 2007).10 
5.4 Harmonisation as defining work  
Consistent with the Slechte Committee principles, harmonisation work had similar aims in 
Netherlands, UK and Australia: to identify commonalities and differences in reportable 
information obligations and reaching agreement among regulators in each jurisdictions to use 
the same definitions of common information in different reports (SBR, 2012). Harmonisation 
work focused on defining, and labelling every reportable data element underpinning 
information obligations. Where the same data elements are duplicated but with different 
names, they were harmonised with the same name and definition (APRA, 2011a). Where data 
elements had the same name but different definitions, they were uniquely labelled (APRA, 
2011). 
Regulators across the three jurisdictions undertook harmonisation work in multi-agency 
settings in similar ways.  Mimicry was useful to facilitate articulating and legitimating 
                                                          
9 COAG was established in 1992 as peak inter-governmental forum to manage matters of national significance 
requiring coordinated action by all Australian governments at federal and state/territory levels (COAG, 2017). 
10 Benchmarking work in Australia was comprehensive. It commenced with a feasibility study in 2007 and 
extensive work between 2008-13 with studies targeting specific regulation areas including business registration, 
occupational health and safety, payroll tax administration, food safety, financial services, land development 
assessment, and environmental approvals (PC, 2007, 2013). 
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harmonisation work and was achieved through the ongoing sharing of experiences at 
international conferences (e.g., annual XBRL International conferences or Standard Business 
Reporting conferences) or regular collaboration between national regulators (e.g., between 
Netherlands and Australia) (Hameleers & Kuipers, 2011; Madden, 2009).  
Nevertheless, there were differences in the ways in which harmonisation work was carried 
out, including scope and approach. Irrespective of the differences (discussed next), a key 
outcome of harmonisation work was to produce country-specific taxonomies: the common 
dictionaries of terms defining information obligations for reporting to government. Each 
jurisdiction codified their taxonomies in XBRL, which was perceived to be the best 
technology available for taxonomy implementations (Ramin & Reiman, 2013; Teixeira, 
2013a). 
5.4.1 Netherlands: constructing normative public-private network 
Early harmonisation work in the Netherlands culminated in 2004 with the Netherlands 
Taxonomy Project (NTP) which in 2009 was rebranded as Standard Business Reporting 
(SBR) and led by Logius11, an agency dedicated to establish government-wide data 
infrastructure12. Two key points are unique about harmonisation work in the Netherlands.  
First, harmonisation work was framed as a public-private partnership and received strong 
political support (Kuipers, 2015). This partnership was formalised in June 2006 where key 
actors including the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Justice and the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, representing three government agencies (e.g., Tax and Customs Administration, 
Chamber of Commerce, and Central Statistics Agency), signed a Covenant of Cooperation 
aiming to reduce the regulatory burden by using the Netherlands Taxonomy for business 
reporting. The Covenant of Cooperation was also signed by representatives of business, 
intermediaries and software developers (Daas & Roos, 2011; DutchParliament, 2006; 
XBRLInc, 2007). 
The Covenant was significant as it meant that SBR was positioned to have a shared identity 
and ownership (Deloitte, 2013). Harmonisation work placed a strong emphasis on taxonomy 
construction as outcome of consensus and cooperation between government agencies and key 
market players including intermediaries and software suppliers (OECD, 2009).  
The agreements between market parties and government are set down in a covenant in which 
the government pronounces in favour of guaranteeing the maintenance and control of the 
taxonomy and process infrastructure. Market parties, especially intermediaries and software 
suppliers, promise that they will use the taxonomy and the process infrastructure and will 
wherever possible pass on any efficiency benefits to their clients, the businesses. (OECD, 
2009, p.37) 
Second, from November 2009 three of the largest commercial Dutch banks13 which together 
dominate the business loan market, committed to adopt SBR for credit reporting. These banks 
had found that approximately 50-80 percent of the information required for business credit 
reporting was the same as what businesses provide to government in statutory reports (ABR, 
2014). By participating in SBR work these banks could re-use this information and contribute 
                                                          
11 Logius was established in 2006 as GBO.Overheid. GBO.Overheid was renamed to Logius in 2010 (EU, 
2010). 
12 This is known as Overheidstransactiepoort (OTP) (DataFoundation, 2017). 
13 The banks are ABN Amro, ING and Rabobank. 
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to reduce the burden for business seeking business loans and investment. Consequently, 
major banks conducted parallel harmonisation work concerning business lending processes in 
conformity with the Dutch SBR harmonisation work (Deloitte, 2013). The parallel approach 
contributed to harmonisation work that included many different market players but focused 
on development of a single shared taxonomy (Deloitte, 2013). 
Harmonisation work in the Netherlands included annual accounts, tax filings, statistics and 
credit reports (Logius, 2010)14 with the scope to be broadened into the future to government 
reporting areas including healthcare, education, agriculture, subsidies, pensions, tax 
compliance, and local government (Geijtenbeek & Lucassen, 2011). It harmonised 
approximately 98% of reportable information obligation items from approximately 200,000 
to 4,500 (DataFoundation, 2017). 
5.4.2 Australia: constructing normative inter-regulator network 
The business case for harmonisation work was approved by the Australian Government in 
2007. It carried strong political support with COAG agreeing in 2008 to support this work as 
means of reducing the administrative burden in Australia (COAG, 2008; Treasury, 2008). 
Harmonisation work in Australia was also branded as Standard Business Reporting and the 
Australian Government committed to mimic the Dutch approach and to collaborate with 
Dutch regulators (DataFoundation, 2017): 
The Australian SBR Program maintains close and regular contact with the NL SBR Program 
to share designs, issue resolution and lessons learned. This collaboration fosters the 
development and introduction of best practices. (Madden, 2009, p.8) 
The Australian SBR program has followed the lead taken by the Netherlands Government in 
initiating an SBR program to reduce the reporting burden on business. (ABR, 2014, p.6)  
Nevertheless, there are differences between the Dutch and Australian approaches. Led by 
Australian Federal Government’s Treasury, harmonisation work in Australia had a broader 
scope than in Netherlands. It comprised thirteen15 regulators operating at federal and 
state/territory levels (APRA, 2011).  
Unlike the Netherlands where the initial focus was on forming a public-private network, the 
key step for Australia was for the inter-regulator network to carry out harmonisation work. 
Such agreement was formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding amongst participating 
regulators (SBR, 2010). 
Furthermore, the Business Advisory Forum (BAF) was established to act as conduit for 
engaging with business. BAF was comprised of many industry groups including professional 
accounting bodies, business, intermediaries and software developers (BAF, 2013). Whilst 
                                                          
14 The Dutch SBR Programme includes Tax and Customs Administration reports (turnover tax return, 
corporation tax return, abbreviated corporation tax return, report concerning intracommunity performance, 
income tax return), Statistics Netherlands reports (production and investment statistics reports), Chamber of 
Commerce annual reports and bank credit reports (Logius, 2010). 
15 Australian regulators participating in harmonization work are Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) which operate at the federal level, and eight Australian state and territory 
revenue offices (ROs) which operate at state/territory level (APRA, 2011). 
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BAF recognised the importance of establishing SBR awareness, they emphasised early 
engagement in harmonisation work with software developers rather than business: 
The key BAF feedback to date suggests software developers and accountants are best placed 
to ensure SBR messages are understood by the business community. Further, while software 
developers will need information on SBR early to fit in with their development schedules, 
businesses should be approached at a later date, closer to when working examples of SBR 
can be demonstrated and at a time when action is required as implementation is imminent. 
(SBR, 2008i, p.11, emphasis added). 
Harmonisation work in Australia encompassed 87 reports16 from across participating 
regulators (Madden, 2009) and harmonised over 80% of existing reportable information 
obligations items, from 33,523 to 6,636 (ABR, 2014; DataFoundation, 2017). 
5.4.3 United Kingdom: constructing normative regulator dyad 
Early harmonisation work in the UK dates back to 2005. It was initially limited to a single 
government agency, namely, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), and subsequently extended 
to Companies House (Deloitte, 2013).  
… the drivers in the UK have been very much Company’s House and HMRC. 
(UK_PAB/IA_3_#1) 
It is important to recognise that HMRC itself was formally established as a tax collection 
authority in 2004 as a result of UK’s ‘better regulation’ program that resulted in the merger of 
two different regulators, namely, HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) with Inland Revenue 
(IR) (APPTG, 2007). Whilst the scope of harmonisation work in the UK is limited to a 
regulator dyad17, narrower than in Netherlands and Australia, it covered a relatively a broad 
range of information obligations facing UK business as suggested below: 
The administrative burden of UK tax regulation is £5.1 billion. … 86% of the tax burden is 
created by 85 information obligations (in simple terms, the blocks of information business is 
required to submit to HMRC or keep on record). (KPMG, 2006, pp. 4-5) 
While representatives from the Federation of Small Businesses, British Chambers of 
Commerce, Institute of Directors and Institute of Chartered Accountants were invited to 
provide input, harmonisation work was predominantly carried out by HMRC and Companies 
House (OECD, 2009). 
Ultimately, harmonisation work in the UK resulted in approximately 4,500 information 
obligation items for HMRC and approximately 450 for Companies House (Mousa, 2010) and 
                                                          
16 The reports that would be available in SBR format include business activity statements, company income tax 
returns and fringe benefit tax returns (ATO), financial reports and notification of half yearly reports (ASIC), 
statements of financial position and performance (APRA), payroll tax returns including periodic returns and 
annual reconciliations (ROs), profit and loss statements and balance sheets, financial reports and statements  and 
notification of half yearly reports (ASIC), and quarterly business indicators survey (ABS) (AUASB, 2010; SBR, 
2009b). 
17 Other regulators in the UK such as Financial Services Authority, Bank of England, London Stock Exchange, 
and Office for National Statistics were initially involved but did not become part of harmonisation work at 
HMRC and Companies House. These regulators wanted to collect a wider range of data (including non-financial 
data) well beyond the predominantly financial data requirements of HMRC and Companies House. 
Consequently, these regulators were allowed to adopt their own solutions which were predominantly based on 
the generic XML technology rather than on XBRL. The desire of these regulators to pursue own XML-based 
solutions was also influenced by limited expertise in XBRL technology (Troshani, Parker & Lymer, 2015). 
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it included company accounts and tax computations (CT600) at HMRC18 and full audited 
accounts at Companies House. 
5.5 Enabling work challenges 
A key outcome of harmonisation work in the Netherlands, UK and Australia was the creation 
of XBRL taxonomies. However, whilst a taxonomy is necessary, on its own it cannot enable 
digital reporting. Software support is critical since it is impractical to use a taxonomy 
manually. Enabling work that would allow government to present digital reporting as a 
channel for business reporting therefore relied to a significant extent on availability of 
XBRL-enabled accounting applications. The applications constitute a medium enabling 
preparers and regulators to exchange business information in a digital format. 
A common approach 19 to enabling work entailed enhancements by software developers to 
existing accounting applications (i.e., typically used by preparers for creating government 
reports) to facilitate processing of information in XBRL form. XBRL enhancements provide 
the means of integrating a specific taxonomy into the application and to automatically 
produce and file digital reports to regulators via government information gateways. This 
process meant that preparers could fulfil information obligations efficiently by reporting only 
once, while regulators could collect required information as needed to carry out regulatory 
functions.  
Wouldn’t you like to have all this [business data] rolled up into one single report 
[submission]? At the moment there’s slightly different [data] fields, you have to put it in one 
way for one consumer [regulator], a slightly different way for a different consumer. You have 
to do it on different dates. Roll it all up together, use XBRL by the way, you don’t need to 
know that it’s called XBRL but if everything is tagged nicely then one consumer will take the 
tax [data] that they need and are legally entitled to. Another consumer will take other data 
they are legally entitled to and things will be so much easier. You will save a lot of 
bureaucracy, a lot of admin time and you can get on with your core business. So there’s the 
sales pitch. (UK_PAB/IA_3_#1) 
This method of preparing and filing government reports suggests that preparers would 
potentially demand XBRL-enabled applications after observing the digital reporting benefits. 
For example, the quotes below illustrate the expectations of regulators across the three 
jurisdictions: 
… if they see [digital business-to-government reporting applications], they will believe… 
(NL_RA_2_#2) 
The best thing is to let successful companies tell the story [about using digital business-to-
government reporting applications] to other companies. We [regulator] also can tell the story, 
but a company is much more convincing. (NL_RA_1_#1) 
                                                          
18 Company tax return reports (UK Companies Act) include balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes to 
accounts, including Director’s and Auditor’s reports (HMRC, 2011a). 
19 Regulators in each jurisdiction also carried out transitional enabling work. They developed tools to facilitate 
taxonomy use enabling preparers to convert traditional reports into digital format. Digital reports could be 
subsequently filed once to government via dedicated portals, enabling preparers to fulfil information obligations 
and regulators to collect information in digital form. This form of reporting was effective in achieving digital 
reporting outcomes for regulators, but required additional digital conversion processes for preparers. This form 
of filing was intended to facilitate transition to digital reporting with XBRL-enabled applications. 
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I am sure they can see the benefits… and that would then create a demand for XBRL[-
enabled] systems [applications]… . (UK_RA_3_#1) 
Regulators across the three jurisdictions had hoped that such demand would be seen as a 
business opportunity by developers/vendors of existing accounting applications (e.g., 
software upgrades and development, consultancy, training).  
However, this was not the case, at least initially, across the jurisdictions. The regulators 
attempted to engage developers to work to develop XBRL-enabled applications. In the 
Netherlands, regulators invoked the Covenant of Cooperation while in Australia similar 
efforts were made via the Business Advisory Forum (BAF, 2013; Bharosa et al., 2015). In the 
UK, software development community was consulted separately through two key industry 
associations representing software development firms20 and software professionals21. Acting 
as agents of their constituencies, these associations offered qualified support given limited 
demand for digital reporting in UK (OECD, 2009). 
A small number of innovative software developers responded to regulator efforts by engaging 
in work to provide XBRL-enabled applications in attempts to gain “foot-in-the-door” 
(UK_SD/V_1_#1) first-mover advantages (see e.g., Accountant, 2010; ICAEW, 2010; PC, 
2012). Nevertheless, the dominant rationale in the broader software developer community 
across the jurisdictions was that there was lack of demand for XBRL-enabled applications 
from preparers and intermediaries. Consequently, developers were reluctant to invest in 
enhancements enabling their accounting applications to process XBRL information. They 
questioned the business case for these enhancements and expected preparer demand to 
materialise before committing to development work (ATO, 2008; NICTA, 2015). 
Why should we bear the costs of changing our software? XBRL will offer no new 
functionality for our customers [since they are not really using it for business-to-government 
reporting]. (NL_SD/V_2_#2) 
Well, we usually try and identify the benefits to both parties [preparers and regulators]. Now 
SBR has identified benefits, honorary benefits of approximately $800 million to the providers 
[preparers] of information. I don’t know how they got those numbers or whether they are 
valid but that’s what has to really happen. There has to be some noticeable benefit and you’ve 
got to be able to cost justify it. (AU_SD/V_1_#1) 
[In Australia] The use of SBR for the lodgement of financial reports is currently constrained 
by the limited number of SBR-enabled software products in the market, particularly for large 
business... Firms have not yet migrated to SBR and a sufficiently large number of users has 
not emerged that would act as a catalyst to generate the development of software products for 
financial reporting more widely usable across industry. (Treasury, 2012, p. 5) 
So, we have had problems in selling XBRL to the software companies… XBRL is a cost for 
them because they have a lot of work introducing it but they can’t really increase the prices 
their software products. So, they fear out the cost without a great deal of benefit. So, the 
business case for the software companies isn’t obviously there. (UK_LXC_1_#2) 
Limited XBRL-enabled applications created challenges for further work by regulators across 
the three jurisdictions as they attempted to present digital reporting as a viable form of 
                                                          
20 Business Application Software Developers Association (BASDA). 
21 British Computer Society (BCS). 
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government reporting to replace traditional reporting. This was a key reason why preparers 
across the jurisdictions struggled to see how digital reporting to government would be 
beneficial to them specifically.  
General perceptions were that regulators would be the key beneficiaries of digital reporting, 
while preparers remained unclear about how they would benefit and how quickly benefits 
would materialise. For example, our evidence shows that preparers in the UK were not 
expecting XBRL benefits to be immediate and not to “come through for two or three years or 
longer” (UK_PAB/IA_2_#1). This sentiment was also captured in surveys funded by 
professional accounting bodies in UK (see e.g., Dunne et al., 2009; ICAS, 2010; Singh, 
2009). 
The same sentiment was shared by preparers in the Netherlands and Australia (Bharosa et al., 
2015; Troshani & Lymer, 2010). Honouring the Covenant of Cooperation, Dutch preparers 
indicated that they would cooperate if that helped the government, but they themselves did 
not expect benefits from digital reporting (Janssen et al., 2010). Likewise, Australian 
preparers believed that digital reporting benefits might accumulate overtime rather than be 
immediate (O'Brien, 2008; PC, 2012). 
Accountants or the smaller stakeholders who adopt XBRL they are likely to take a while 
before they can actually experience XBRL benefits. (AU_PAB/IA_3_#1) 
I just can’t see people willing to invest, apart from big organisations. They probably will, 
because they would be able to look at the strategic level of some of this stuff.  But at a smaller 
organisation level, I’m not sure that they’re going to be motivated. (AU_PAB/IA_2_#1) 
The benefits are evident to companies [preparers]. The main issue is if the benefits will 
become visible and when the benefits will become visible. Why bother about some ‘pennies’ 
in the future which needs much attention and effort to realise [at present]?! Software 
developers can make other [non-XBRL] investments. This makes it necessary to make a 
compelling business case for a broader range of preparers. (NL_SD/V_2_#2) 
 [XBRL] adoption requires a big fish to show the benefits.... if the big fish fails [to show 
benefits], nobody will follow. (NL_PAB/IA_1_#1) 
Another key reason behind lack of demand for XBRL-enabled applications concerned the 
incentives of intermediaries to use digital reporting for business clients. Digital reporting was 
perceived by intermediaries as threat diminishing their traditional consulting roles. While 
advocacy across the three jurisdictions had highlighted savings from digital reporting, much 
of these savings would come from reduced intermediaries’ fees charged to clients due to 
simplification of business reporting to government (Bakker, 2012; IGT, 2015). Digital 
reporting would result in “loss of processing and compliance work for many accounting 
firms….[with consequential effect that] accountants must adapt their offerings to remain 
relevant” (AD, 2016). To many intermediaries across the jurisdictions, these savings were in 
fact lost revenue, a dis-incentive to support digital reporting or demand XBRL-enabled 
applications. 
5.6 Disconnecting sanctions of traditional reporting, embedding and routinizing work 
Irrespective of issues discussed previously, regulators across the jurisdictions created digital 
reporting channels for business. These channels have now been mandated across the 
jurisdictions, and digital reporting has become embedded and a routine form of government 
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reporting. There are, however, differences in the approaches taken between jurisdictions 
concerning the manner in which sanctions were disconnected from traditional reporting and 
reconnected to digital reporting. Dutch and Australian regulators initially introduced digital 
reporting as a voluntary reporting channel alongside traditional reporting. By contrast, UK 
regulators mandated digital reporting after presenting it as an exclusive channel. These 
differences had implications for shaping reactions of preparers but also incentives for 
software developers to offer XBRL-enabled applications in each jurisdiction. 
5.6.1 UK: a soft-landing approach to mandate 
In 2009, UK regulators mandated digital reporting for all preparers reporting to HMRC and 
Companies House, effective from April 2011 (HMRC, 2009, 2011). UK interviewees 
consistently agreed that HMRC’s “authoritative power” (UK_SD/V_4_#1) “force[d] them 
[preparers] to do it [use digital reporting]” (UK_LAF_3_#1). 
I think we all would agree that really the chicken and egg effect has been broken due to the 
regulators taking over. (UK_PAB/IA_2_#1) 
The digital reporting mandate stimulated significant engagement of preparers with HMRC 
intensifying work towards creation of digital reporting. Immediately after the mandate was 
announced, preparers raised concerns about the time required to understand digital reporting 
and integrate it into existing reporting processes and availability of XBRL-enabled 
applications (Dunne et al., 2009; ICAS, 2010; Singh, 2009). The concerns were also related 
to legal implications concerning filing of business information without filers knowing about 
the specific view of the reports which regulators would see (CH, 2013; ICAS, 2010). The 
concerns were addressed using Inline XBRL (iXBRL)22, a mechanism for rendering digital 
reports that facilitates regulators receiving reports in the form which filers intended (Rowden, 
2013). 
In response to these concerns, HMRC committed to a ‘soft landing’ approach to the mandate. 
Accordingly, in the first two years after digital reporting became mandatory, they would look 
leniently on preparers who made efforts to meet digital reporting requirements and assist 
them rather than apply penalties (HMRC, 2013a). The aim of this approach was to create 
opportunities for preparers and software developers to become ready for digital reporting 
(CoreFiling, 2013).  
Greater engagement of preparers generated demand for XBRL-enabled applications to which 
software developers responded by enhancing their applications (HMRC, 2013a; ICAEW, 
2010). HMRC strengthened engagement with developers and introduced processes for 
approving new and enhanced XBRL-enabled applications (FSN, 2009). With approved 
applications available, preparers could fulfil digital reporting requirements (ABAB, 2012; 
BTF, 2013). 
But technical solutions are just falling into place. There are two aspects, I think. At least as far 
as UK is concerned at putting technical solutions in place. One is having finished taxonomies 
which allow companies or software vendors to put the data in XBRL properly. And the other 
aspect ... concerns the heading of what we call rendering in XBRL [which] basically means... 
being able to create a human readable version of an XBRL document. (UK_SD/V_2_#1) 
                                                          
22 iXBRL ensures that digital reports are internally structured using XBRL tags, but their presentation is not 
different to that of equivalent traditional reports (e.g., in paper or PDF format). 
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Evidence suggests that digital reporting increased significantly in UK after the mandate 
became effective. In the 2013 Business Tax Forum, HMRC reported that approximately, 
eighty-five percent of returns received from preparers had been made using commercially 
available XBRL-enabled applications, while the remainder via HMRC’s free online XBRL 
lodgement tool (HMRC, 2013d). In 2015, approximately 1.9 million UK preparers had 
successfully filed to HMRC using digital reporting (XBRLUK, 2015a). Many users, 
including other regulators are sharing and information that is already filed to HMRC and 
Companies House suggesting that filers are benefiting from a reduced burden (XBRLUK, 
2015b). 
5.6.2 Netherlands and Australia: From voluntary adoption to phased-in mandate  
Digital reporting became available to preparers in the Netherlands and Australia from 2008 
and 201023, respectively. Dutch and Australian preparers could voluntarily use either digital 
reporting or traditional reporting channels. The voluntary approach in these jurisdictions was 
underpinned by regulators’ expectations that preparers would recognise benefits and 
voluntarily choose digital reporting channel rather than the lesser efficient traditional 
reporting alternatives (e.g., web- and paper-based channels)(Cain, 2013; Janssen et al., 2010; 
NICTA, 2015; Power, 2013). These expectations however remained unfulfilled in both 
jurisdictions: digital reporting uptake remained low (DataFoundation, 2017). 
Most Dutch business were choosing to report via the traditional rather than the digital channel 
(Bharosa et al., 2015; NICTA, 2015).  
State Secretary De Jager stated at that point that he expected it to be possible for all tax 
declarations by business to be done using XBRL by 2008. Although expectations were high at 
the time, the uptake of solutions provided by the NTP was disappointing. (Bharosa et al., 
2015, pp. 382-383, emphasis added)  
We invested in knowledge creation, however, there are only a few experts who are using this. 
(NL_RA_2_#1) 
Similarly the number of Australian preparers using digital reporting reports remained 
negligible (Power, 2013). For example, in 2013-14 only 1 percent of 2.1 million registered 
Australian businesses used digital reporting (ABS, 2016; ATO, 2014) while in 2014-15 that 
number was 4.6 percent (ATO, 2015). Whilst Australian preparers could optionally use 
digital reporting to file tax reports, the vast majority were using traditional channels including 
the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) flagship Electronic Lodgement Service (ELS) or 
even paper-based forms (IGT, 2015). 
Availability of traditional and digital reporting channels had unintended consequences for the 
enabling work of software developers. There was little incentive for preparers to use digital 
reporting which affected demand for XBRL-enabled applications, with consequential effects 
on incentives for software developers in Netherlands and Australia (NICTA, 2015). 
Traditional channels were identified by regulators and software developers as “key 
impediment” (IGT, 2015, p. 67) for digital reporting in these jurisdictions (ATO, 2008; 
DataFoundation, 2017). 
                                                          
23 ATO, ASIC and State/Territory ROs have provided digital reporting channel since July 2010. APRA provided 
digital reporting channel on July 2011 (APRA, 2011). 
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[O]ther available online reporting services for lodging government reports have meant that at 
present there are only modest or uncertain gains from using SBR over the current methods of 
online reporting. These existing channels successfully compete with SBR… The 
Commission’s consultations with software developers have highlighted a mixed response to 
SBR, even though many software developers acknowledge its theoretical benefits …. (PC, 
2012, p.110) 
Although software developers recognise the benefits of SBR, they do not see a market 
opportunity to develop SBR-enabled software as long as ELS continues to be supported by 
the ATO... (IGT, 2015, p.67) 
In response to the low digital reporting uptake, regulators in Netherlands and Australia 
mandated digital reporting using a phased-in approach. Such an approach was adopted the 
Netherlands from January 2013. Accordingly, the scope of the XBRL mandate would become 
progressively wider to include reporting to additional regulators: 
We would have preferred not to have any regulation at all, but we needed some kinds of push. 
Therefore, we negotiated with industry associations to introduce legislation and introduced a 
system to gradually demand more …. (NL_RA_3_#3) 
From 2013 onwards, companies in the Netherlands will be required to use SBR (Standard 
Business Reporting) for filing tax declarations, statutory accounts, and credit reports to 
government agencies… (Wallagh & Van Den Ende, 2013, p. 53) 
The Dutch parliament moved on Thursday this week [November 26th, 2015] to mandate 
electronic filing of financial accounts to the Chamber of Commerce (the national business 
registrar). The legislation phases in XBRL reporting as part of the Dutch SBR program, 
with small companies starting next year. Filing for medium-sized companies will start in 2017 
and all private entities will be covered by 2019. (Nitchman, 2015) 
In Australia, the phased-in approach was initially applied by Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority which mandated use of digital reporting from July 2013 (ABR, 2015a) while ATO 
phased out the ELS from March 2017 which it replaced with the Practitioner Lodgement 
Service (PLS), an XBRL-enabled channel. PLS is an exclusive tax reporting channel and 
mandatory from April 2017 (ATO, 2016, 2016a; Nitchman, 2016). 
The phased-in mandate in the Netherlands and Australia enhanced interest of software 
developers in both jurisdictions. Work provisioning XBRL-enabled applications accelerated 
immediately after the mandate was announced. Developers and vendors came to the forefront 
of market developments in the Netherlands and the XBRL-enabled applications they provide 
are now being increasingly used by preparers to fulfil their government reporting obligations.  
Most users are not interested in XBRL. They buy software that works. We should ensure that 
these software employs XBRL…. (NL_SD/V_2_#2) 
In the period just after the digital reporting mandate was announced in Australia over 220 
software developers began developing XBRL-enabled applications for government reporting, 
a sharp rise relative to period before mandate was announced (ATO, 2015; ICB, 2015). 
The mandate and availability of XBRL-enabled applications were associated with a steady 
rise in digital reporting in both jurisdictions. For example, after the mandate became effective 
digital reporting increased to 2.7 million XBRL reports filed to Dutch regulators in 2013 
(Bharosa et al., 2015; SBRP, 2014) which increased further to 29.8 million in 2016 
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(Willemsen, 2017). Similarly, in Australia it is expected that the 20 million tax reports that 
are normally filed via the ELS channel (ABR, 2015) will be filed using the PLS digital 
reporting channel from 2017 (Jackson, 2014). 
6. Concluding discussion 
There is paucity of research concerning the institutional work that shapes the transformation 
of business-to-government reporting. The objective of this paper has been to explain how 
traditional business-to-government reporting is being disrupted and replaced with digital 
reporting in attempts to reduce the administrative burden on business. We addressed this 
objective by investigating how actors in the Netherlands, UK and Australia have carried out 
institutional work to achieve this transformation. Across these jurisdictions, digital business 
reporting is powered by XBRL, a radical technology that digitises reports, facilitating 
exchange of information between business and regulators and sharing among regulators. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the forms of institutional work that were observed in the 
selected jurisdictions and the key differences and challenges. 
TABLE 2. Observed forms of institutional work 
Category Institutional work in 
selected jurisdictions 
Key differences and challenges 




and beliefs (quantify 
administrative burden and 
identify threats to 
productivity and growth) 
EU regulation, and 
national regulation-
setting culture 
EU regulation and 
‘gold-plating’ 
Multi-level 
regulation and need 
for benchmarking 














Advocacy Focus on regulation 
that is ‘strictly 
necessary’ 
Focus on ‘better, 






Reconfiguring identities and 
normative associations 




Follow the Dutch Follow the Dutch 
Vesting work New independent 
body to monitor 
institutional work 
New independent 






Harmonisation work to 





Via regulator dyad 
Maintaining 
work 
Enabling work  Similar challenges observed across jurisdictions to engage with 
software developers/vendors to construct digital business-to-
government reporting applications 
Embedding and routinizing Voluntary use 
followed by phased 






followed by phased 
in mandate of 
digital reporting 
 
We contribute to accounting literature by offering an empirically grounded theoretical 
account of the role of institutional work in the regulatory domain of business-to-government 
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reporting. We have explained how supportive conditions can be brought about and how these 
conditions can be made to coalesce in multi-regulator settings for a new form of reporting to 
become established and widely adopted by business. To the best of our knowledge, this study 
appears to be the first comprehensive empirical analysis focusing on three jurisdictions that 
are international leaders in broader government reform initiatives and specifically in multi-
agency business reporting. 
Our simultaneous analyses show the impact of international influences on local digital 
government reporting. We find that institutional work in the digital reporting space is 
characterised by mimicry: that is, work that occurs in a jurisdiction is influenced by work that 
occurs in other jurisdictions. Our evidence shows that regulators across the jurisdictions have 
been challenging excessive regulation as key cause of administrative burdens in similar ways. 
Much of the work that occurred in UK and Australia followed the Dutch approach to 
addressing administrative burdens. 
This underscores the need for broadening the conceptual scope of the study of institutional 
work and government transformation to the broader international context when regulators in 
one jurisdiction freely elect to follow regulators in another. This is an important contribution 
since existing institutional research has predominantly examined efforts of actors by focusing 
on the societal and cultural implications but limited to specific national contexts (see e.g., 
Chiwamit, Modell & Yang, 2014; Troshani, Parker & Lymer, 2015) or to international 
contexts where choice of national regulators is dictated or constrained by international 
regulation (e.g., European Union requirements on EU nations)(see e.g., Guerreiro, Rodrigues 
& Craig, 2014). 
We also find that whilst institutional work that was carried out in the Netherlands influenced 
work in the UK and Australia, local factors contributed to shape the specific nature and scope 
of this work in these jurisdictions. Both UK and Australian regulators committed to follow 
the Dutch approach to reduce regulatory burdens but they customised institutional work to 
suit their local requirements. For example, Australian regulators carried out additional 
disruption work (benchmarking) to better assess administrative burdens, a choice that was 
dictated by the unique nature of multiple jurisdictions operating at federal and state/territory 
levels in Australia. Benchmarking was not necessary in the Netherlands or UK. Similarly, 
while Netherlands and UK established dedicated structures to support administrative burden 
reduction (ACTAL and BRE), Australia vested such roles to an existing structure (Australian 
Productivity Commission). 
Whilst some differences in the observed nature of institutional work can be attributable to 
variation of local conditions, other differences can be explained with the notion of ‘work 
displacement’: institutional work that is used to replace originally intended forms of work 
because of their unintended consequences (Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016; Chiwamit, Modell & 
Yang, 2014). Work displacement could explain what occurred in the Netherlands and 
Australia when regulators decided to change the path from voluntary to mandatory adoption 
of digital reporting after observing that voluntary adoption was producing unintended results, 
that is, continued use traditional reporting by preparers and general apathy towards digital 
reporting by preparers and software developers. 
Our analyses confirm the effectiveness of regulatory mandate in stimulating disruption of 
traditional reporting to government and its replacement with digital reporting. This effect 
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however was expected, as widely documented in existing research (see e.g., Guerreiro, 
Rodrigues & Craig, 2014; Hyvönen et al., 2009). Nevertheless, evidence of institutional work 
carried out across the selected jurisdictions illuminates three different transformation paths 
for digital reporting that intersect but that also run different courses. Analysing these paths 
side-by-side was particularly insightful in illustrating how ineffective voluntary approaches 
were in institutionalising digital reporting. Whilst the scope of digital reporting was evidently 
different across the three jurisdictions, weak voluntary uptake led both Dutch and Australian 
regulators to abort voluntary approaches in favour of mandated approaches, a path which UK 
regulators avoided by immediately applying a mandate and achieving desired digital 
reporting outcomes early. 
Furthermore, harmonisation work was carried out across the jurisdictions to achieve similar 
outcomes (shared taxonomies). The configurations of networks within which harmonisation 
work occurred, were different across the jurisdictions: a public-private network was used in 
the Netherlands, an inter-regulator network in Australia, and a regulator dyad in UK. These 
configurations had no evident influence on preparer perceptions concerning the benefits of 
digital reporting being superior to traditional reporting. For example, we expected the 
voluntary approach taken in the Netherlands to be effective since a public-private network 
including representatives of preparers, and major banks was used to carry out harmonisation 
work. However, our evidence did not support this expectation. The Dutch public-private 
network was not more effective than the UK and Australian regulator-dominated networks in 
shaping preparer perceptions favourably towards digital reporting. Dutch regulators also had 
to resort to a mandatory approach to achieve desired digital reporting uptake. Our evidence 
suggests that preparers across the jurisdictions held similar beliefs that regulators were key 
beneficiaries of digital reporting. 
We also find that actors who did not perceive the digital reporting institution to serve their 
interests became engaged in institutional work in response to concessions, compromise (see 
e.g., Chiwamit et al., 2014) and incentives offered by regulators rather than in response to 
proactive action. The soft landing approach adopted by UK regulators is an example of 
compromise and concession employed to encourage engagement in creation work before the 
mandate took effect in the UK. 
Voluntary adoption in Netherlands and Australia served regulators’ interests, but was not 
perceived by most preparers and software developers to serve their interests in these 
jurisdictions. By contrast, the digital reporting mandate across all jurisdictions served both 
the regulators’ interests, and those of the software developers since it created a market for 
them. Arguably, in all jurisdictions the mandate also incentivised preparers because it 
presented digital reporting to them as an exclusive reporting channel. The mandate, therefore, 
transferred the normative associations between rewards (sanctions) and having to fulfil 
information obligations from traditional reporting to digital reporting. The mandate created 
an incentive for preparers to perceive digital reporting as something which they had to use 
irrespective of whether they believed that they would benefit from it or not. This suggests that 
interests of actors in an institution can be characterised both as benefits that are derived from 
engaging in institutional work (e.g., for regulators and software developers) but also as 
obligations: preparers became interested to adopt digital reporting because it is the only 
alternative offered to them to fulfil information obligations, and not because they necessarily 
believe they will benefit from it. 
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We find that various forms of institutional work are carried out in an intertwined manner and 
produce cumulative effects. We show how various institutional work forms can be combined 
to support and reinforce each other in the multi-agency domain of government reporting 
(Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016). This is a direct response to recent calls for further research 
focusing on the interplay of institutional “work interrelationships” (see e.g., Chiwamit, 
Modell & Yang, 2014). Accordingly, we find that institutional work forms are mutually 
dependent. Embedding and routinising work was highly dependent on enabling work. 
Regulators across the jurisdictions had to ensure that working XBRL-enabled applications 
were available before they could mandate use of digital reporting as an exclusive reporting 
channel. Similarly, harmonisation work producing taxonomies constitutes key work to be 
completed before enabling work could be expected to begin on XBRL-enabled applications. 
We also find that institutional work forms can be mutually reinforcing. For example, 
disruption work was carried out across the jurisdictions where traditional reporting forms 
were discontinued while at the same time digital reporting was presented to business as an 
exclusive channel. Removing traditional reporting strengthened the importance of using 
digital reporting to business as the only available reporting alternative. 
These examples also show that the “empirical reality” (Empson, Cleaver & Allen, 2013, 
p.837) of our cases is such that specific forms of institutional work do not necessarily occur 
as distinctly as implied by the analytical categorisation of Lawrence & Suddaby (2006) nor in 
the simplistic conceptual sequencing of Jepperson (1991). Indeed, disruption of traditional 
reporting work occurred in the beginning of the process of institutional transformation of 
government reporting, as suggested by Jepperson (1991), but also towards the end of the 
process (e.g., when adoption mandate became effective in each jurisdiction by disconnecting 
rewards (sanctions) from traditional reporting, and reconnecting them to digital reporting (see 
e.g., Canning & O'Dwyer, 2016; Hayne & Free, 2014). Nevertheless, the analytical 
differentiation of institutional work comprising disruption, creation, and maintaining work is 
a useful high level conceptualisation of institutional change (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). 
Our findings have important implications for all actors of the business-to-government 
reporting domain, including regulators, business, intermediaries, software developers, 
professional accounting and industry associations. Our findings can inform policy-making 
and practice, while offering evidence of institutional work in jurisdictions where institutional 
transformation of reporting to government is under consideration. 
We generalise our findings to the broader theory while also extending existing institutional 
work research to the domain of business-to-government reporting in multi-agency settings 
(Payne & Williams, 2005). We warn, however, that our findings should be considered as 
provisional. Future research in other settings needs to confirm, correct, and elaborate the 
extent to which our findings apply to other settings. Nevertheless, given the wide range of 
participating organisations and the rich nature of data collected, our findings may be 
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Background: name, function, organization, country 
1. What is your organization’s involvement in XBRL development and your particular 
role? 
2. Which organizations are involved in XBRL development (in the 
UK/Australia/Netherlands)? 
3. What are the drivers of XBRL (in the UK/Australia/Netherlands)? How did the drivers 
change over time? 
4. How and why did your organization decide to join XBRL development and negotiation 
processes? 
5. How and why does your organization re-position itself as new actors, including business 
partners and competitors, join XBRL development and negotiation processes (or as 
existing participating organisations change their original positions)? 
6. How do negotiation processes unfold, work, succeed, fail, and what problems are 
encountered and how are they overcome? 
7. What are the roles of consortia (e.g. XBRL UK/Australia/Netherlands), relevant industry 
associations, and government agencies in XBRL development efforts? And how did the 
roles change over time? 
8. What patterns of interactions (alliances, competition, etc.) and dynamics surround XBRL 
development (in the UK/Australia/Netherlands)? 
9. Which events influence the pattern of interactions? Which event was most influential? 
10. How does the variety of interests among XBRL stakeholders threaten XBRL 
development and how is collective participation of representative members of 
heterogeneous groups ensured in XBRL development processes? 
11. How are costs and benefits shared amongst the actors that participate in XBRL 
development and negotiation processes? Were there changes in the sharing of costs and 
benefits over time?  
12. What are the drivers and inhibitors affecting XBRL development in the 
UK/Australia/Netherlands? 
13. Which organizations does your organization interact with in its XBRL development 
efforts (and how)? Who are the individuals in these organizations that you interact with 
and how do you interact with them? (or that you know are involved in XBRL 
development in their organizations)? 
14. Are the any other issues concerning XBRL development that have not been covered and 
that you wish to bring to our attention? 
15. Who else do you think we should talk to? 
 
 
 
 
